List of Digested Cases
The City Government of Quezon City and the City Treasurer, Dr. Victor B. Enriga vs. Bayantel (G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006)
2. RCPI vs. Provincial Assessor of South Cotabato (G.R. No. 144486, April 13, 2005)
3. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Globe Telecom (G.R. No.147324, August 25, 2004)
4. Smart Communications and PILTEL vs. NTC (G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003)
5. Republic vs. Meralco (G.R. No. 141314, November 15, 2002)
6. Belltel vs. NTC (G.R. No. 16496, April 30, 1997)
7. PLDT vs. NTC (G.R. No. 88404, October 18, 1990)
8. Evangeline Aala et.al. vs. Globe Telecoms (CA- G.R. CV No. 78049)
The City Government of Quezon City and the City Treasurer, Dr. Victor B. Enriga vs. Bayantel
(G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006)
FACTS: Bayantel is a legislative franchise holder under Republic Act No. 3259 to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting located at Quezon City. Bayantel owned several real properties on which it maintained various telecommunications facilities.
The real properties are:
(a) Bayantel’s Head Office and Operations
(b) Bayantel’s land, building and equipment; and
(c) Bayantel’s Exchange Center.
On January 7, 1999, Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties but this request was denied. Bayantel interposed an appeal with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). On its firm belief of its exempt status, Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City government. The Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the total amount ofP43, 878,208.18, followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against Bayantel’s properties preparatory to their sale at a public auction set on July 30, 2002.
ISSUE: Whether Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes under its legislative franchise
HELD: Yes, real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes under its legislative franchise.
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations.
Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel’s former exemption from realty taxes, Congress opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11 thereof, exactly the same defining phrase “exclusive of this franchise” which was the basis for Bayantel’s exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 states that “the grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay.” The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee’s (Bayantel’s) properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.
RCPI vs. Provincial Assessor of South Cotabato
(G.R. No. 144486, April 13, 2005)
FACTS: In 1957, Republic Act No. 2036 granted RCPI a 50 year franchise. Section 14 of RA 2036, reads:
Sec. 14. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted and any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the grantee shall pay the same taxes as are now or may hereafter be required by law from other individuals, copartnerships, private, public or quasi-public associations, corporations or joint stock companies, on real estate, buildings and other personal property except radio equipment, machinery and spare parts needed in connection with the business of the grantee, which shall be exempt from customs duties, tariffs and other taxes, as well as those properties declared exempt in this section. In consideration of the franchise, a tax equal to one and one-half per centum of all gross receipts from the business transacted under this franchise by the grantee shall be paid to the Treasurer of the Philippines each year, within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts as prescribed in this Act. Said tax shall be in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind, nature or description levied, established or collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial or national, from which taxes the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.
On 10 June 1985, the municipal treasurer of Tupi, South Cotabato assessed RCPI taxes from 1981 to 1985 in the amount ofP166, 810 as real property tax on its radio station building in Barangay Kablon, as well as on its machinery shed, radio relay station tower and its accessories, and generating sets.
RCPI protested the assessment before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). RCPI claimed that all its assessed properties are personal properties and thus exempt from the real property tax. Assuming that the assessed properties are real property, they are still exempt from real property taxes. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 464 states that to be taxable, the machinery should be attached to the real estate and essential for manufacturing, commercial, mining, industrial, or agricultural purposes. RCPI claimed that the assessed properties are not used for manufacturing, commercial, mining, industrial, or agricultural purposes. Besides, the assessed properties are attached to a building on a lot not owned by RCPI.
RCPI also pointed out that its franchise exempts RCPI from “paying any and all taxes of any kind, nature or description in exchange for its payment of tax equal to one and one-half per cent on all gross receipts from the business conducted under its franchise.” RCPI further claimed that any deviation from its franchise would violate the non-impairment of contract clause of the Constitution. Finally, RCPI stated that the value of the properties assessed has depreciated since their acquisition in the 1960s.
1. Whether the tower, relay station building and machinery are exempt from tax.
2. Whether the depreciation allowance is included in the computation of tax declarations and assessment.
First issue: No. RCPI’s radio relay station tower, radio station building, and machinery shed are real properties and are thus subject to the real property tax
It is an elementary rule in taxation that exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. It is the taxpayer’s duty to justify the exemption by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted.
Section 14 states that “in consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted and any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the grantee shall pay the same taxes as are now or may hereafter be required by law from other individuals, co-partnerships, private, public or quasi-public associations, corporations or joint stock companies, on real estate, buildings and other personal property x x x.” The clear language of Section 14 states that RCPI shall pay the real estate tax”.
Second Issue: Yes, under the Real Property Tax Code depreciation allowance applies only to machinery and not to real property.
Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Globe Telecom
(G.R. No.147324, August 25, 2004)
FACTS: Globe had been engaged in the coordination of the provision of various communication facilities for the military bases of the US in Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. The said communication facilities were installed and configured for the exclusive use of the US Defense Communications Agency (USDCA), and for security reasons, were operated only by its personnel or those of American companies contracted by it to operate said facilities. The USDCA contracted with said American companies, and the latter, in turn, contracted with Globe for the use of the communication facilities. Globe, on the other hand, contracted with local service providers such as the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) for the provision of the communication facilities.
On 07 May 1991, Philcomsat and Globe entered into an Agreement whereby Philcomsat obligated itself to establish, operate and provide an IBS Standard B earth station (earth station) within Cubi Point for the exclusive use of the USDCA. The term of the contract was for 5 years. In turn, Globe promised to pay Philcomsat monthly rentals for each leased circuit involved.
Both parties knew that the Military Bases Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the US was to expire in 1991. On August 6, 1992, Globe notified Philcomsat of its intention to discontinue the use of the earth station effective November 8, 1992 in view of the termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
After the US military forces left Subic Naval Base, Philcomsat sent Globe a letter dated November 24, 1993 demanding payment of its outstanding obligations under the Agreement amounting to US$4,910,136.00 plus interest and attorney’s fees. However, Globe refused to heed Philcomsat’s demand.
1. Whether the termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement constitute force majeure which would exempt Globe from complying with its obligation to pay rentals under its Agreement with Philcomsat;
2. Whether Globe is liable to pay rentals under the Agreement for the month of December 1992; and
3. Whether Philcomsat is entitled to attorney’s fees and exemplary damages.
First Issue: Yes. Article 1174, which exempts an obligor from liability on account of fortuitous events or force majeure, refers not only to events that are unforeseeable, but also to those which are foreseeable, but inevitable. Philcomsat and Globe agreed in Section 8 of the Agreement that the following events shall be deemed events constituting force majeure: particularly: 1. any law, order, regulation, direction or request of the Philippine Government. Under Article 1306 of the Civil Code, parties to a contract may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem fit, as long as the same do not run counter to the law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, Section 8 of the Agreement which Philcomsat and Globe freely agreed upon has the force of law between them.
Second Issue: Yes. The US military forces and personnel completely withdrew from Cubi Point only on December 31, 1992. Thus, until that date, the USDCA had control over the earth station and had the option of using the same thus the Court of Appeals did not err when it affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Globe is liable for payment of rentals until December 1992.
Third Issue: No. Philcomsat is not entitled to attorney’s fees and exemplary damages.
The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule, and must be supported by factual, legal and equitable justifications. In previously decided cases, the Court awarded attorney’s fees where a party acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the other party’s claims and compelled the former to litigate to protect his rights; when the action filed is clearly unfounded, or where moral or exemplary damages are awarded. However, in cases where both parties have legitimate claims against each other and no party actually prevailed, such as in the present case where the claims of both parties were sustained in part, an award of attorney’s fees would not be warranted.
Exemplary damages may be awarded in cases involving contracts or quasi-contracts, if the erring party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. In the present case, it was not shown that Globe acted wantonly or oppressively in not heeding Philcomsat’s demands for payment of rentals. It was established during the trial of the case before the trial court that Globe had valid grounds for refusing to comply with its contractual obligations after 1992.
Smart Communications and PILTEL vs. NTC
(G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003)
FACTS: On October 20, 2000, petitioners ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the NTC an action for declaration of nullity of the Billing Circular, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioners ISLACOM and PILTEL alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. This was granted by the trial court.
On October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NTC from implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000(the Billing Circular).In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
1. Whether the private respondents failed to exhaust an available administrative remedy.
2. Whether NTC and not the Regular Courts has jurisdiction over the case.
3. Whether the Billing Circular issued by the respondent NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public policy.
First Issue: No. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
In this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective position papers setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 2000 and July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October 6, 2000, when respondent NTC issued the second assailed Memorandum implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.
Second Issue: No. Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Third Issue: No. In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred that the Circular contravened Civil Code provisions on sales and violated the constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law. These are within the competence of the trial judge. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards – and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by Energy Regulatory Board vs. Manila Electric Company
(G.R. 141314, November 15, 2002)
FACTS: On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of 21 centavos per kilowatt-hour (kwh) in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172. On January 28, 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184 per kwh, subject to the following condition:
“In the event, however, that the Board finds, after hearing and submission by the Commission on Audit of an audit report on the books and records of the applicant that the latter is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicant’s customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions.”
On February 11, 1997, the COA submitted its Audit Report SAO No. 95 – 07 (the “COA Report”) which contained, among others, the recommendation not to include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for purposes of rate determination and the use of the net average investment method for the computation of the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the determination of the rate base. The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be “borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business” hence, should not be passed on to the consumers.
On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167 per kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCO’s customers beginning February 1994 and its billing cycle beginning February 1998. The regulation of the rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statues prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof.
ISSUE: Whether the State exercises its police power in regulating rates for public use.
HELD: Yes. In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates, which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. It is a settled rule that the goal of rate-making is to arrive at a just and reasonable rate for both the public utility and the public, which avails of the former’s products and services. However, what is a just a reasonable rate cannot be fixed by any immutable method or formula. Hence, it has been that no public utility has a vested right to any particular method of valuation.
Accordingly, with respect to a determination of the proper method to be used in the valuation of property and equipment used by a public utility for rate-making purposes, the administrative agency is not bound to apply any one particular formula or method simply because the same method has been previously used and applied. In fact, nowhere in the previous decisions cited by MERALCO, which applied the trending method, did the Court rule that the same should be the only method to be applied in all instances. Thus, the burden is upon the oppositor, MERALCO, to prove that the rates fixed by the ERB are unreasonable or otherwise confiscatory as to the merit the reversal of the ERB. In the instant cases, MERALCO was unable to discharge this burden.
GMCR INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INT’L COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO. INC., vs. BELL COMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC., THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND THE HON. SIMEON KINTANAR
(G. R. No. 16496, April 30, 1997)
FACTS: Bell Telecommunications (BellTel) filed before the NTC an application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to procure, install, operate and maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services (NITS) and a Provisional Authority (PA) to effect such. During such application, BellTel has not been given a legislative franchise to engage in the telecoms service which made in unable to participate in the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service (LEC) where the petitioners participated in. Subsequently, RA 7692 was enacted granting BellTel a congressional franchise.
On July 12, 1994, BellTel filed a second application for a CPCN, proposing to install 2.6 million telephone lines in 10 years and to provide a 100% digital local exchange network. It also moved for the withdrawal of the first application, without prejudice, which was granted by the NTC. BellTel’s application was opposed by various telecommunications companies. BellTel’s application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD), which found the BellTel’s proposal technically feasible and BellTel to be financially capable. The two deputy commissioners of the NTC signified their approval of the CCAD recommendation. The working draft was prepared by the legal department, was initialed by the two deputy commissioners, but was not signed by NTC Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
The petitioners questioned the validity of the PA because according to them it is the prevailing policy and procedure in the NTC that the Commissioner has the exclusive authority to sign, validate and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC and only his vote counts. BellTel filed two motions to resolve the application and the issuance of the PA but the NTC did not act on it. In that relation, the petitioners filed an opposition. Commissioner Kintanar issued then an Order setting said motions for hearing but did not resolve said motions. However, no hearing was conducted and it was rescheduled.
BellTel filed a motion to promulgate, after previously filing two urgent ex-parte motions to resolve application, which was not acted upon by the NTC. The NTC denied the motion in an order signed solely by Commissioner Kintanar. BellTel then filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against NTC before the SC. The Court referred the case to the CA. The CA granted BellTel’s position. Hence, the petitions for review by the opposing telecommunication companies and Commissioner Kintanar.
ISSUE: Whether the vote of the Chairman of the Commission is sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution and decision.
HELD: No. Having been organized under Executive Order 146 as a three-man commission, the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time it was acting as a one-man regime. NTC is a collegial body requiring the majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decides a case or any incident therein. The vote alone of the chairman of the commission, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. EO 546, which created NTC under the Ministries of Public Works and of Transportation and Communication, does not specifically provide that the NTC is not a collegiate body nor did it mention that NTC should meet an En Banc in deciding the case or quasi-judicial functions. However, this does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTC because the Rules of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings states that in cases heard by the Board En Banc, the order or resolution should be reached with the concurrence of at least two regular members after deliberation and consultation. NTC Circulars 1-1-93, 31-1-93 and the Order of Commissioner Kintanar, declaring the NTC as a single entity, are contrary to law and thus are null and void.
PLDT vs. NTC and Express Telecommunications (ETCI)
(G.R. No. 88404, October 18, 1990)
FACTS: ETCI filed an application with public respondent NTC for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct, install, establish, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an Alpha Numeric Paging System in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with a prayer for provisional authority to operate Phase A of its proposal within Metro Manila.
PLDT filed an Opposition with a Motion to Dismiss, based primarily on the following grounds: (1) ETCI is not capacitated or qualified under its legislative franchise to operate a system wide telephone or network of telephone service such as the one proposed in its application; (2) ETCI lacks the facilities needed and indispensable to the successful operation of the proposed cellular mobile telephone system; (3) PLDT has itself a pending application with NTC, Case No. 86-86, to install and operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System for domestic and international service not only in Manila but also in the provinces and that under the “prior operator” or “protection of investment” doctrine, PLDT has the priority or preference in the operation of such service; and (4) the provisional authority, if granted, will result in needless, uneconomical and harmful duplication, among others.
After evaluating the reconsideration sought by PLDT, the NTC, in October 1988, maintained its ruling that liberally construed, applicant’s franchise carries with it the privilege to operate and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service.
On 12 December 1988, NTC issued the first challenged Order. Opining that “public interest, convenience and necessity further demand a second cellular mobile telephone service provider and finds PRIMA FACIE evidence showing applicant’s legal, financial and technical capabilities to provide a cellular mobile service using the AMPS system,” NTC granted ETCI provisional authority to install, operate and maintain a cellular mobile telephone system initially in Metro Manila, Phase A only, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the same Order.
ISSUE: Whether NTC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting provisional authority to ETCI.
HELD: No. There was no grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the National Telecommunications Commission.
The decisive considerations are public need, public interest, and the common good. Those were the overriding factors which motivated NTC in granting provisional authority to ETCI. Article II, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution, recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation building. It is likewise a State policy to provide the environment for the emergence of communications structures suitable to the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country.
Despite the fact that there is a virtual monopoly of the telephone system in the country at present. Service is sadly inadequate. Customer demands are hardly met, whether fixed or mobile. There is a unanimous cry to hasten the development of a modern, efficient, satisfactory and continuous telecommunications service not only in Metro Manila but throughout the archipelago.
Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a much-desired improvement in the quality and delivery of this type of public utility, to improved technology, fast and handy mobile service, and reduced user dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other public utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly position in view of the Constitutional proscription that no franchise certificate or authorization shall be exclusive in character or shall last longer than fifty (50) years. Additionally, the State is empowered to decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited (1987 Constitution. Article XII, Section 19).
Evangeline Aala et.al; vs. Globe Telecoms
(CA- G.R. CV No. 78049)
FACTS: Petitioners (herein appellants) Evangeline Aala et.al alleged, among other things that they are the principal, students and teachers of Solano National High school (SNHS); that they are all residents of Barangay Quirino, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, except for the teachers and students of the SNHS who are considered transient to the said barangay where the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) or cell cite antenna tower of Globe is constructed; on or about 20 of May, 2002, Globe immediately, surreptitiously and suspiciously started to construct the BTS on 400 sq. lot, which is not in accordance with existing laws, rules, and regulations; it appears that before that before construction of BTS, it is required that several permits, clearances, certifications and consent be first accomplished and granted by different government agencies concerned. Globe, through its representatives, started the construction of its BTS which is still on-going without the required permits, clearances, certification and consent; prior to construction, petitioners seasonably registered their protest and opposition to the construction of cell site antenna, on the grounds of security and safety concerns and it being a health hazard. Petitioners then prayed for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin petitioners from further constructing the BTS. Globe then filed an opposition to the plaintiff’s prayer of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The trial court ruled in favor of Globe Telecoms. The trial court found that the BTS constructed is not within the scope of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) System; hence, it is not required for Globe to secure an Environmental Compliance certificate (ECC). That since the BTS emits radio frequency radiation, which is classified as non-ionizing radiation, the World Health Organization made it clear that it is inconclusive relative to cancer. That rendered perceive health risks by the petitioner is unfounded, as there is no showing that defendant Globe failed to observe the minimum safe distance prescribed by the Health Physicist who made an actual inspection of the proposed cell site. An appeal was made by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the appellants are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stop the construction of defendant’s BTS?
HELD: No, the main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or in incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course in an injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should be confused with, the provisional the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. From the forgoing, we sustain the trial court’s dismissal of the main action for injunction. Appellants were not entitled to writ of preliminary injunction, much more to a judgment embodying a final injunction. Appellants failed to prove that they are entitled to have the construction and installation of the appellee’s BTS in Barangay Quirino complained of permanently or perpetually enjoined.
P!nk featuring Lily Allen
Sometimes I hate every single stupid word you say,
Sometimes I wanna slap you in your whole face.
There’s no one quite like you, you push all my buttons down,
I know life would suck without you.
At the same time I wanna hug you, I wanna wrap my hands around your neck.
You’re an ******* but I love you, and you make me so mad I ask myself
Why I’m still here, or where could I go? You’re the only love I’ve ever known, but I hate you, I really hate you, so much I think it must be…
True love true love
It must be true love
Nothing else can break my heart like true love
True love, it must be true love
No one else can break my heart like you
Just once try to wrap your little brain around my feelings
Just once please try no to be so mean
Repeat after me now R-O-M-A-N-C-E
Come on i’ll say it slowly (Romance)
You can do it babe
At the same time, I wanna hug you
I wanna wrap my hands around your neck
You’re an ******* but I love you
And you make me so mad I ask myself
Why I’m still here, oh where could I go
You’re the only love I’ve ever known
But I hate you
I really hate you, so much
I think it must be
True love true love
It must be true love
Nothing else can break my heart like true love
True love, it must be true love
No one else can break my heart like you
Why do you rub me up the wrong way
Why do you say the things that you say
Sometimes I wonder how we ever came to be
But without you i’m incomplete
I think it must true love true love
It must be true love
Nothing else can break my heart like true love
True love, it must be true love
No one else can break my heart like you, like you
No one else can break my heart like you
I’m currently obsessed with pink, I mean P!nk the singer, the artist and my all time female singer in the US. Her current album “The Truth About Love” is currently on no. 1 on Billboards hit charts and personally, this is her best album ever. It’s like Jason Mraz album “We Sing. We Dance. We Steal Things.”, an album full of amazing songs. I may be a sucker for music coz I have memorized the lyrics of her songs.
I’m obsessed with yellow. It’s my favorite color. For me it represents the sun, which means summer to me, which means cool breeze, beach, friendly smiles and awesome smell of the sea or grassland, either way, it represents my happy place.
I’m obsessed with black. Most of my dresses, pants, shirt, might as well my wardrobe is mostly black. I believe the whole week i have been wearing black. It’s my comfortable color, it makes me feel I’m slim (not with flabs hehe), it makes me be indifferent, it makes me feel like no one will dare me. I’m invinsible and powerful (especially in heels!)
In short, I’m just plain obsessed.